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will disclose the perfect difference in the undercurrents of thought prevailing at the time when our government commenced its experiment and at present. Beginning in darkness and doubt, national interests and policy have insensibly conquered the first place in the estimation of the people. Although not contemplated in his philosophy, Jefferson's natural sympathies and acquired principles would have led him to observe this great change more quickly, and to regard it more profoundly, than any other of our statesmen. His was the policy of his time; its success was in the completeness with which it was adapted to existing circumstances, and in no case do his principles allow a success derived from any other source. The Constitution, to which there was at first no way open to secure the affections of the people except through the States in which their political life was centred, is now in immediate connection with them. The change has been accomplished without diminution of the personal freedom which he prized; and his authority can never be rightfully invoked in support of a construction no longer vitalized by the popular breath, and only retained as a shackle upon the movements of a free and progressive people.

ART. II. — FAITH AND SCIENCE.

THE controversy between head and heart, between letter and spirit, goes back to the days of Cain and Abel; and though happily the sanguinary fruit it then bore, in the violent suppression of the higher interest by the lower one, is no longer possible, inasmuch as the question is removed from a personal to a purely intellectual ground, still the controversy endures in unabated vigor, and demands of every candid mind its best efforts to reconcile it. Nothing, indeed, but a hope of doing this to some extent, could induce us to ask the reader's attention to the observations which follow; but whether our hope in this respect be fully vindicated to his judgment or not, we are sure he will in the end acquit us of having said anything to aggravate the existing contention.

Ever since the dawn of our intellectual history, two rival hypotheses in regard to man's being and destiny have striven for the mastery of the human mind; which we may name severally the religious and the sceptical hypothesis, or, in modern parlance, the spiritualist and the materialist hypothesis: the one basing itself upon revelation, and having it in view as a practical result to subordinate Nature to Man; the other basing itself upon actual knowledge or experience, and having it in view as a practical result to subordinate Man to Nature. This controversy profoundly agitates, at the present moment, the entire world of thought; but it exists, perhaps, in most concentrated form in France, whence it is overspreading with new impetus the general mind of England and our own country. Much, no doubt, had been done by previous disputants to familiarize the literary consciousness in both countries with the controversy; but none of these persons approached it with that tone of authority and that air of competence which belong to the combatants of the present hour. The battle is now far more definitely urged than it has ever been before. Kant and Sir William Hamilton, having become the adopted philosophic sponsors of the sceptical cause, endow it with arms of superior temper to any it has yet wielded; while Cousin and his followers, who are now confessed champions of supernaturalism, impart to the opposite camp an unwonted intellectual grace and dignity.

What is the ostensible ground of the controversy? It is whether human history is a strictly natural phenomenon, or a strictly supernatural one; whether man's origin and destiny transcend nature, or whether they fall exclusively under the dominion of natural law. Faith maintains that man's origin and destiny are strictly supernatural; while Science implicitly, if not always explicitly, regards him as essentially a subject of Nature, and a sharer consequently of her fortunes, whatsoever they may be. Faith says that man is made out of nothing, being summoned into being by a literal creative fiat. Science, on the other hand, insists that man is essentially natural, being formed as to his body out of Nature's substances, as to his mind out of her knowledges, as to his heart out of her appetencies and affections; and that no theology

therefore can account scientifically for man, unless it account at the same time for Nature as well. Such is the substance of the dispute,—to know whether man is God's creature irrespectively of natural law, or in strict dependence upon it. The one party holds creation to have been a purely arbitrary, or at least immethodical, procedure on the part of God, having no sanction but that of his own omnipotent will. The other holds it to be a strictly rational proceeding, having the most unswerving reference to the methods and order of Nature. The believer is very much afraid that, if Science have her way on this point, the *heart* of man will grow cold towards God, and his devotion disown at last any higher inspiration than the intellect. The *savant* is concerned, on his side, lest, if Faith establish her ascendancy, the *mind* of man may grow disinterested in the highest themes, and so allow his affections and conduct to fall a gradual prey to superstition.

At bottom, the matter disputed between Faith and Science is the measure of respect we owe to Nature. The meaning of Nature is the pivotal point of the controversy; and whosoever can shed any light upon that subject may reasonably claim an attentive hearing. Nature, as illustrated by Science, seems to be offering every day some new and more startling complication of the religious problem, as that problem is envisaged by faith. The realm of law is seen to be infringing upon the hitherto inviolable realm of freedom to such an extent that fear is felt lest the principle of responsibility be weakened in the human breast, and man learn ere long to confess himself the mere sport of his organization. To allay these fears and give repose once more to human hope, what will suffice? Evidently nothing short of a new insight into the meaning of Nature. Nothing but this promises to end the contention which grows every day more embittered. Faith, whose sole business has ever been to affirm the creative substance of things, and not at all their phenomenal constitution, now more than ever insists that we come from God exclusively and return to God exclusively; and hence that, so far as we are complicated with any third thing, as Nature, we are really estranged from God, and liable to be eternally separated from him. To the devout conscience, accordingly, the play of the

natural life seems intrinsically dangerous, and no condition of the soul so safe as one in which Nature's force is kept in stern abeyance to self-denying practices or multiplied ritual observances. No doubt that there is an abundant leaven of wilfulness in the fussy ecclesiastical tendencies of the day, and that very much of the formal rituality which has overgrown our plain Protestant consciousness is flagrantly aggressive, insincere, or histrionic. Still, a certain logic attaches to and dignifies the entire ecclesiastical conception of human life, which is, that Nature is positively evil, evil *in se*, and hence productive of irretrievable disaster to all who do not voluntarily renounce her sway.

Science, whose business, on the other hand, is never with the creative substance of things, but only with their phenomenal apparition, has come to affirm with more or less emphasis a contrary doctrine. We say *more or less* emphasis, for Science is by no means definitely constituted as yet, having arrived at no adequate or authentic self-consciousness in any of her representatives. We use the word Science, then, only to indicate a general agreement among scientific men, as we use the word Faith to indicate a general agreement among religious men; and scientific men agree as a general thing in disowning the antithesis which Faith alleges between Man and Nature; while they insist that Nature, relatively to herself alone and independently of all theologic considerations, furnishes not only a legitimate field of inquiry to the mind, but a direct avenue possibly to the highest knowledge. They insist that man has a manifest constitutional identity with all other existence, in spite of his inextinguishable individuality or difference, and therefore is not to be spiritually interpreted without due regard being had to this natural subjection of his. However the theologian may read our spiritual origin and destiny, he has thus not the least right, according to Science, to make Nature enter into those relations as a foreign element, but only as a domestic one. Science shows us that we have not the slightest ground of self-consciousness, not the slightest basis of identity, but what Nature affords us: thus, that our spiritual individuality, to whatever heights it may subsequently soar, always claims anchorage in Nature, and can never afford to disclaim it. It alleges,

therefore, a substantive, and no longer reflected, worth in Nature ; not merely an indirect, but a direct, testimony to the Divine power and glory ; and exacts accordingly in effect that Man range himself in line with Nature, if he would have his own testimony accepted as valid. Within these limits, it is true, the difference between Faith and Science has been one of understanding rather than of principle, the attitude of the one combatant being really, though not conventionally, as devout as that of the other ; and we perceive consequently all along the course of history a certain amity and fellow-feeling kept up between the partisans of revealed and those of natural religion.

But in our day the quarrel has grown very much envenomed. From being a mere intellectual disagreement, it has become a highly practical one, involving the most lively personal issues. Faith is no longer content to dwell with Science, nor does Science care any longer to conciliate Faith. Faith, from having once been sincerely speculative, shrinks now evermore within the timidest limits of tradition or authority. Science, from having been once sincerely theistic, is fast becoming either frankly pantheistic or boldly atheistic. From having once encouraged ontological and metaphysical research, it now authoritatively restricts inquiry to the field of the senses. From having once recognized infinite and finite, God and man, as substantive cognitions, it now recognizes Nature alone ; and does not hesitate to avow by the voice of her bolder disciples, MM. Comte and Taine in France, Sir William Hamilton, Mr. Mansel, and Mr. Spencer in England, that neither infinite nor finite, neither absolute nor relative, have any reality to us, save as signs of our own mental imbecility ; and hence that all legitimate inquiry restricts itself to the realm of Nature, the realm of the phenomenal or the indefinite.

We repeat, then, that, the warfare between Faith and Science having assumed this portentous aspect, there can be no hope of bringing it to an equitable termination, unless we find a meaning in Nature which both combatants have hitherto failed to discover. Both of them regard Nature without any misgiving as a positive quantity, able according to Faith to embarrass the intercourse of God and man with eternal complications, able according to Science to give man a sensible existence quite

irrespective of any presumable spiritual relation he may be under to God. Faith affirms the creative paternity of God towards man, in utter indifference to the constitutional uses Nature renders him. Science affirms the constitutive maternity of Nature towards us, in utter disregard of the creative issues to which such maternity is subservient. Faith does not know how to deal with the natural or generic element in existence; Science does not know how to deal with its spiritual or specific element. They neither of them, in short, suspect the true logic of Nature, which is her strictly *constitutional* subserviency to the human consciousness, and hence are incapable of ever coming to a mutual understanding. For this is the sole secret of their future possible reconciliation, — that Nature be seen to resolve itself utterly into Man, and hence to avouch a purely phenomenal disjunction on his part with God, in the interest exclusively of their real and permanent spiritual conjunction. Neither Faith nor Science has the least title to invalidate the other's claim to our respect, — no more title than the heart of the body has to dominate the lungs, or the lungs the heart. And it is idle, therefore, to think of bringing about any friendship between them, save upon the frankest recognition of their joint and equal validity in respect to the perfected evolution of the mind; which recognition is impossible, unless we find a doctrine of Nature deep enough, on the one hand, to justify the devout mind without affronting the scientific instinct, and broad enough, on the other, to affirm the scientific instinct without wounding the tenderest legitimate susceptibility of the religious conscience.

We are sure, then, that our readers will not refuse us their attention, if our effort to interest them take the shape of a doctrine of Nature with which their own previous thought may not have familiarized them, but which tends practically to reconcile Faith and Science by showing Nature to be indeed the hyphen which logically disunites man and God, creator and creature, but only in order that they may be spiritually united in eternal harmony. We shall aim at no rigidly formal exposition of our theme, but study to make a popular statement. It seems to us, indeed, that the simple rectification we propose to make, both of religious and scientific thought, is very easy to follow;

will only require ordinary attention and good-will on the reader's part perfectly to master it; and then it will open to him, unless we greatly deceive ourselves, such novel and engaging horizons of thought, that he will not deem his attention and good-will to have been ill-bestowed.

A famous controversy — the beginnings of which date from Plato's idealism and the opposition that doctrine encountered in Aristotle — raged among the schoolmen as to the import to be accorded to general or universal terms; as to whether they denoted real existences or mere mental abstractions. The one party contended that the generic term *horse*, *hog*, or *rose*, for example, implied a real existence independent of all particular horses, hogs, or roses. The other insisted that these generic terms were mere mental generalizations, expressing what to our perception all horses, all hogs, all roses, have in common, and were otherwise devoid of substance. This battle of realist and nominalist waxed very furious, involving church and state alike at last in its folds;* but although nominalism, or the Aristotelian doctrine that universals were only mental abstractions clad with names, while individuals alone exist, eventually claimed the ascendancy, no advantage at all commensurate with the vigor of the debate resulted to the practical intellect from it, for the simple reason that both parties to it were alike blind to the profound philosophic issues involved in it. The fundamental question which underlay that long and fierce encounter, and which yet never came to the surface of it, was this: whether quantity determined quality, or quality quantity; whether identity involved individuality, or individuality identity, — because on the former of these hypotheses, existence would be scien-

* It is pleasant and touching to see the enthusiasm with which M. Cousin, in his edition of Abelard's literary remains, celebrates the renown which this metaphysical dispute enjoyed in its day, and the hubbub it excited in church and state. "Behold," he cries, "the power of principles! A problem scarcely worthy, you would say, to occupy the reveries of philosophers begets divers metaphysic systems. These systems agitate the schools, but at first produce no further result. Before long, however, they pass from metaphysics into religion, and thence into politics. Thus they become launched upon the historic scene. William the Conqueror espouses the quarrel of the English clergy against Roscelinus, and Louis VII. presides over the assembly in which St. Bernard, the hero of the period, controverts the conceptualist Abelard, master of Arnold of Brescia," &c., &c. — *Petri Abelardi Opera*, Preface. (Paris, 1849.)

tifically unintelligible ; and on the latter, claim a truth past all sophistry to subvert or even enfeeble. In other words, the true question in dispute was a question about the absolute reality of things ; namely, whether such reality inhered in the form of things, in what gives them name, quality, character, and so objectively individualizes or differences them from other things ; or whether, on the contrary, it inhered in the nature of things, in what gives them consciousness or selfhood, and so subjectively identifies them with all other things. For in the former case, Science, which is a research of the universal *quale* that subtends all quantity, of the unitary form that animates all substance, would be fully authenticated ; in the latter, sense would rightfully claim to dominate, and the progress of human society or brotherhood bring up at last in a filthy monasticism.

For example, the realist contended that the hog was a universal rational quantity before it was a particular sensible one ; that there was not only any number of particular hogs extant to sense, but also, and much more, a grand generic hog extant to the soul or reason ; thus, that the individuality of the hog, or what gives it name, quality, or being as hog, is not anything above the hog, as human reason, human logic, human science, but simply the very nature, selfhood, or identity of the animal, or what he possesses in common with all other animals. Obviously, then, the fault of realism, as it called itself, was to confound the absolute being of things with their phenomenal form ; to merge, for example, the logical individuality of the hog, its characteristic quality which makes it hog instead of horse or rose, in its mere material identity, which makes it a quantitative fact of existence, like all other facts. Else why be at the trouble to construct this preposterous ideal hog in order to realize all particular hogs ? Manifestly the ideal or generic hog can present no qualitative difference to the actual or particular hog, under penalty of voiding his function, but only a quantitative difference. He is much more of a hog than the particular one ; while the particular one is much less of a hog than he. This is all the difference. If, then, the particular inhere in the general ; if it derive from the latter its distinctive quality or individuality, all that makes it hog instead of horse or rose ; and if the general be yet no way qualitatively, but only

quantitatively, distinct from the particular, — why, it becomes instantly evident that there is and can be no particular existence, no individuality or difference among things, but only a wide-weltering community or chaos. Thus realism practically ended by sinking the ideal in the actual; the spiritual in the natural; individuality or difference in identity or sameness; or, what is the same thing, confounding form with substance, being with existence, object with subject, cause with effect, and so virtually annihilating both. For if you confound things which exist only by each other's oppugnancy, you of course deprive them of existence.

The nominalist had at least a lively instinct, if by no means a clear intellection of these disastrous issues to the idealist doctrine, and he met it accordingly by a broad, emphatic denial. For if, said he, there be this grand generic hog, from which all particular hogs, this grand generic horse or rose, from which all particular horses or roses exist, — if there be, in fine, a grand generic everything from which every particular thing descends, — why, then it is plain that all our science turns out to be an everlasting seesaw between being and existence, between genus and species, substance and form; and Philosophy, or the mental progress of the race, undergoes a decisive arrest. For Philosophy is nothing but a voucher of the absolute unitary being which underlies and is yet most distinct from all phenomenal existence, — of the qualitative form which underlies, and is yet most distinct from, all quantitative substance; and if, therefore, you make this absolute being — this qualitative form — of things only an exaggerated ghost of the things themselves, you stultify philosophy by reducing it to a puny, pedantic idealism. I find myself constrained accordingly, pursued the nominalist, to take contrary ground to the realist, and maintain inviolate the scientific instinct, which is, that all existence or subjectivity is particular; consequently that all generals or universals have a purely logical or nominal force, as denoting the substantial community or identity which the mind itself assigns to these particulars as the necessary background or purchase of its recognition of them.

Unquestionably the nominalist fought a good fight. He had a dim instinctive perception of the truth that nature and spirit,

genus and species, substance and form, were not directly, but inversely, related; and he determined that the ideal or spiritual reality of things should never be vindicated, if he could help it, at the expense of their natural identity. He saw in short, however dimly, that the material constitution of existence offered the basis of fact which was necessary to the truth of its spiritual creation; and he insisted, therefore, with an unerring instinct, that no disparagement should befall the minor interest, without an instant fatal reaction upon the major one.

Now, why have we recalled this old controversy? Merely with a view to poise, and, if we may so say, posit, the reader's judgment for a more intelligent survey of our existing controversies. The war now waging between Faith and Science is substantially the same as that which engaged realist and nominalist; the fundamental question in debate, now as then, being how to reconcile nature and spirit, fact and truth. The ecclesiastic of our day is only the realist of a former generation, who claims that an ideal realm, or realm of substance, be found subtending this natural realm, or realm of appearance, wherein everything which is here phenomenally good or evil, beautiful or ugly, stands energized in absolute lineaments. And the sceptic of this age, in like manner, is but the nominalist of a departed one, who claims for Nature a positive Divine life or substance, not to be invalidated nor invaded by any more positive; and to this end insists that phenomenal good and evil can never, from the nature of the case, attain to absolute dimensions, but must always remain phenomenal or relative, since their existence is totally contingent upon each other's coexistence. Such is the pass, then, at which the intellect has arrived: half the intellectual world contending in effect that sense is absolute, and controls reason; the other half, that it is relative, and demands the constant supervision of reason. And this pass turns out practically an *impasse* for the intellect; for although Science is perfectly competent to renounce Faith when Faith complacently degrades itself to sense, or confesses itself superstitious, yet Science is but the normal, robust, untiring handmaid of Faith, when Faith itself is spiritual and seeks only to promote Divine peace on earth and good-will towards men.

But now, at last, let us see whether this controversy is really as desperate as it has the air of being. Let us inquire whether a doctrine of Nature cannot be compassed, which shall effectually vacate this vexatious rivalry between Faith and Science, by proving natural existence to be at least no less real than spiritual existence, so satisfying the man of science; and yet, as such reality, forever subordinate to spiritual existence, so placating the man of faith. Our readers have only to accord us a placid half-hour's attention, then, and we shall discharge our duty to them with as few unnecessary words as may be found practicable.

Since the dawn of the speculative intellect, there has been but one question at bottom seriously agitated among men, — a question as to Nature's reality. The interest of this question to the devout mind turns upon the fact, that, if Nature's existences prove to be real, faith in the supernatural will necessarily fall into disuse. Its interest to the sceptical mind, on the other hand, turns upon the fact, that, if Nature's existences prove to be unreal, Science, of course, which is an investigation of the laws of natural existence, falls to the ground, and with Science all hope of an ultimate Divine order upon earth. The reader sees then, at a glance, what an immense significance this word *reality* has to Philosophy, and how important it is at the outset to ascertain what real existence is.

By *real* existence men mean what exists in itself, or has selfhood; that is to say, a form of existence in which the specific or formal and objective element is not overborne by the generic or substantial and subjective element, but is at least equal to it, as in the moral form of existence, if not superior, as in the spiritual form. Now undoubtedly the very term Nature excludes the conception of this sort of reality as pertinent either to mineral, vegetable, or animal; because these are types of existence in which what is generic or substantial dominates what is specific or formal; so that no freedom or rationality, and consequently no real selfhood, can be ascribed to the subject. To this extent, accordingly, Plato and Kant are both right in stigmatizing Nature as unreal, as a ceaseless flux in which nothing ever attains to being, but only to seeming. But they both exhibit an inexcusable pusillanimity in abandoning

the pursuit of reality here ; an inexcusable philosophic timidity in supposing that this state of things in mineral, plant, and animal reflects any such discredit upon Nature's reality as justifies them in laboriously substituting for this phenomenal flux of things, the one a world of ideal, the other of intellectual substance, in which every forlorn Benedick of a phenomenon shall ultimately find himself mated and fated to an absolute, inexorable Beatrice. For clearly man claims a natural genesis no less valid than that of mineral, plant, or animal ; and moral existence, which is the distinctively human form of Nature, presents that precise equilibrium or balance of the two constitutive elements of all existence, — namely, genus and species, identity and individuality, subject and object, body and soul, flesh and spirit, — upon which selfhood or personality is irresistibly contingent ; and selfhood or personality is the only philosophic reality. Moral existence, or human nature, is constituted of an exact and indissoluble *marriage* between the two elements of universality and individuality, which make up indeed all existence, but are conjugally related in no form below the human ; since in every other form the generic or masculine element coerces the specific or feminine element, and makes it the slave of its lusts. And wherever this marriage exists, we have personal consciousness as a result ; that is to say, the consciousness of a life as real as God's life, since it enables us to comprehend, aspire after, and finally conjoin ourselves with his infinite perfection. Now it was their complete oversight of this hierarchical or conjugal distribution of the two constitutive elements of all natural existence, in the moral or human form of such existence, that led Kant and Plato to idealize Nature, and so provoke the scientific protest and reaction which befell their speculations, — the former in the Hegelian, the latter in the Aristotelian logic.

But leaving both Kant and Plato to their honored repose, the goal to which we invite our readers' thought is, on the one hand, the recognition of man, or moral existence, as constituting Nature's true reality ; and, on the other, the recognition of human society, or brotherhood, as the true Divine destiny of man on earth, and the comprehensive answer consequently to every doubt suggested by Faith or by Science. But let us do

all things in an orderly manner. Let us, for example, first of all satisfy the reader's just expectation, in justifying what we have said as to the constitution of Nature in general, or showing it to be made up of two warring forces,—genus and species, race-force and family-force, force of identity or extension and force of individuality or intension,—the former of which rules and the latter obeys,—until we come to man, in whom the two hitherto warring forces are reconciled in eternal amity, and by such reconciliation afford the basis of a new or spiritual evolution of life.

What is Nature? What meaning does the word convey when we reflectively examine it? Let us endeavor to fix this meaning by an exact analysis of its habitual contents.

The word has two meanings,—one specific, which is its meaning to sense; the other generic, which is its meaning to reason. And it is only by rightly adjusting these that we are able to master the total force of the word.

Nature, as specifically defined, means whatsoever the senses discern, whatsoever can be seen, heard, smelt, tasted, touched. It means whatsoever we see around us unappropriated by art; so much of earth and air as falls within the periphery of our sensuous organization. It means the rocks, the lake, the river, the grass, the flowers, the trees, the birds, the beasts, the insects, we actually behold by sense; in short, the realm of specific form or individuality.

Generically defined, Nature means more than this. For we no sooner grow familiar with the various forms our senses unfold, than we begin to perceive that there is not one of them absolutely isolated, not one of them but acknowledges some bond of connection with every other; thus, that everything embraced within the scope of our senses claims a something in common with all other existence, as well as a something of difference: the former giving the thing body or generic identity with all other things, the latter giving it soul or specific diversity from all other things. We may say, then, that Nature, viewed rationally, means the realm of generic substance or identity; sensibly regarded, it means the realm of specific things; rationally regarded, it means what is generic, common, or universal in those things.

Thus Nature presents two faces to us, according as we make a sensible or a rational judgment of its contents.

But now there can be no doubt that the abstract use of the word allies it with the latter, rather than the former signification,—allies it with the substantial or universal element in existence, rather than the specific or differential one. For whenever we make an abstract judgment of Nature, we separate in thought what is common to all existence from what is particular, and call that Nature; while we call the latter horse, tree, mountain, cloud, water, or whatever else circumstances appoint. Rather let us say that the word expresses *primarily* the common or substantial element in existence, and the specific or formal element quite subordinately. It implies, of course, when carefully scrutinized, the alliance of a common substance with a specific form; but then unquestionably it emphasizes the former element in the alliance, and leaves the latter a purely reflected or derivative force.

If we should be called upon in these circumstances to hazard a philosophic description of Nature, we might characterize it as a style of existence in which what is generic or relatively universal dominates what is specific or relatively individual. Or, better still, we might say that Nature is what universalizes or identifies all existence, even while allowing it the utmost specific variety.

For example, when we conceive or speak of "the universe of Nature," we mean by the phrase the community of existing things, or that substantial identity which each has with all, and all with each, underlying and antedating all their formal or visible differences. We mean, in short, the sum of all existence; the sum of all the things which are actually or potentially embraced in our varied senses. We suppose that there is an actual whole answering somehow to the particulars which we see and hear and smell and taste and touch; and this whole we quietly postulate as subjectively or organically existing under the name of "the universe of Nature."

So, also, when we say "the nature" of a diamond, of a rose, of a sheep, the word in these applications designates the community of existence, the identity of substance, which the sheep, the rose, the diamond, has with all other sheep, all other

roses, all other diamonds. It denotes what universalizes, and therefore identifies every sheep as sheep, in spite of its specific differences from all other sheep; every rose as rose, in spite of its specific contrast to other roses, as tea-rose, moss-rose, china-rose, and so forth; every diamond as diamond, in spite of its sensible variation from all other diamonds. Thus the word expresses in every case what gives the thing identity of substance, community of existence, with its kind, and through that with everything else. In short, Nature is what to our imagination gives objectivity or logical background to everything that exists, and so allows it its subjective or phenomenal apparition.

We repeat, that we should be authorized, by all that has gone before, to accept the above as a philosophic account of Nature. But then it is to the last degree important to observe, that, although Nature has this intellectual use, or furnishes to our thought an objective ground for all the shifting phenomena of our senses, *it is only to our thought that she does this*, inasmuch as she is utterly destitute of subjective existence, existence in herself, her total subjectivity being constituted by her specific forms. There is no such actuality as we ascribe to Nature when we give her an existence over and above her particular forms; and the sooner we disabuse ourselves of the superstition, the better, for it is the outbirth exclusively of the sensuous imagination, and is fatal to a spiritual discernment of creation. Nature has no subjectivity or existence in herself, as the rock has, or the horse, or the tree, but only to our infirm thought, which, being incapable of abiding God's direct spiritual effulgence in the phenomena of our senses, is obliged to veil or obscure it under this imaginary substance called Nature, and so accommodate it to recognition. It is the logical drapery under which our intelligence instinctively cloaks the splendor of the creative name in order to save its tender eyes from blight, and has not the slightest pretension to substantive validity. Being thus rigidly impersonal, thus utterly destitute of spiritual or subjective quality, Nature is able to offer herself with equal readiness to the demands of the most opposite styles of existence. She is herein like the letter of Revelation, which lends itself with equal ease to every interpretation which the highest wisdom, or the baldest folly, may put upon it. She is, in

short, the realm of the indefinite, of what escapes definition, being neither infinite nor finite, neither God nor man, neither creative nor created, but a *tertium quid*, or transient neutral quantity effectually separating between the two.

Any definition we may give of Nature, consequently, must be purely abstract, expressing the mental conception we frame of her, but having no answering external reality. We may, for example, call her the unity of all her forms. But this is a purely mental conception, besides being very inexact even as such. For, in the first place, there is no concrete reality nor ghost of a concrete reality answering to the designation, since all of Nature's forms are more or less antagonistic to each other; and what natural or concrete substance can you conceive of as uniting and so neutralizing these antagonisms? What actual thing can you conceive of as the unity of arsenic and chalk, hemlock and wheat, tiger and sheep, serpent and dove? Evidently the unity of these things forces you at once upon the recognition of *human* nature, upon the conception of *moral* existence, as alone adequate to justify it. Thus the bare question as to Nature's personality or selfhood takes you instantly out of the mineral, vegetable, and animal realm, and confronts you with man.

Viewed apart from man, Nature presents, and must always present, a mere coexistence of opposites; never their disappearance or resolution into a higher form of being, which their concrete unity would imply. The unity of the gases gives us water or air, which are less diffuse, more concentrated, more individualized, and therefore superior forms of existence to the gaseous. The unity of air and water is not found in themselves, but in the mineral. The unity of the mineral kingdom, in like manner, is not found in any universal mineral substance, but in the vegetable form of existence, to the production of which all mineral forms aspire or are subservient. The unity of the vegetable kingdom again refers itself, not to any universal vegetable form, but to the exigencies of the animal form exclusively; and the unity of the animal kingdom, in its turn, is to be found only in man, or moral existence. Thus the unity of opposing substances is never to be sought upon the same plane with the substances themselves, but a degree

above them, in some higher form of existence. These opposing mineral, vegetable, and animal substances are so many preliminary analyses, addressed to our infantile intelligence, of some grander synthetic forms of life successively to appear; their whole use in every case being to predict the advent, and educate us to the discernment, of a higher style of existence than they themselves disclose. The deepest or most sacred of all unities, that of the sexes, avouches its truth only in procreation; nothing being more opposite in aspect, in manners, in character, in function, than the male *in se* and the female *in se*, especially in the higher forms of being. And so, indeed, of all unity: it never means a mere mental aggregation of particulars, but the evolution of a distinctly higher form of life than the particulars themselves, taken together, supply. And yet this impracticable unity is really all we have in our thought, when we term Nature the unity of all her particular forms. We make her the mere summing up or aggregation of the contents of our senses actual and possible; which summing up or aggregation is a purely mental product, having no particle of actuality out of our own thought.

But in the second place, the statement, besides being philosophically untrue, is even, as we have already said, scientifically inexact, inexact within its own limits. For so far is what we call Nature from constituting the concrete mental unity of all her forms, that she is the exact and total opposite of such unity, being in strictness of speech their utmost conceivable community, identity, or indifference. The term includes whatsoever the senses discern; it is whatsoever can be seen, heard, smelt, tasted, touched. Rationally defined, therefore, we should say Nature was the *community* of existing things, their point of identity, in which they are all alike and equally comprehended, whatever individual disagreements sever them from each other. Nothing exists to our perception which does not exist specifically; which does not report itself in some grosser or subtler form to our senses. And Nature, when generically defined, means what all these existences, thus reporting themselves to our senses, *possess in common*; the widest mental generalization or impersonation which has yet been given to this community by Science being gravitation.

Of course, in ordinary speech, we mean by Nature what we see around us, — so much of earth and air as falls within the circumference of our sensitive organization. We give all these various contents of our senses a unitary appellation as *natural*, because, whatever diversities of form and structure they present to our intelligence, these diversities are not moral or conscious, as inferring any individual complicity on their part, but strictly physical, as imposed upon them by their kind. Mineral, vegetable, and animal have only a natural subjectivity, a subjectivity accruing to them from their race or kind, being precisely what that makes them to be: so that if some higher unity than they themselves supply did not compel them into its orderly subservience, by giving them hierarchical distribution, they would instantly forfeit their various individuality; i. e. would relapse into their original community, indistinction, chaos, non-existence, — for absolute community is spiritual non-existence.*

To sum up: Nature is a pure fantasy of our rudimentary intelligence, permitted by the Divine wisdom in the interest of our eventual and perfect spiritual sanity. What we call Nature is no *thing*, but a most strict process or functioning of the creative love toward our spiritual manhood. It is nothing more nor less than the living method which the creative energy adopts in order to spiritual proliferation. Spiritual or individual existence cannot be directly propagated, — requires some mediator between itself and the paternal source. The bare conception of an opposite possibility is nugatory, since the existence so propagated, as we have seen, would be without selfhood or identity, while the fundamental postulate of spiritual existence is, that its proper objectivity fall within, and not

* The same law governs all our restricted scientific applications of the word. The nature of the horse means what all horses possess in common and without regard to their specific diversities, — whatsoever makes them horses instead of camels or asses; that is to say, what identifies them as horses in spite of their individual differences, as roadster and racer, cart-horse and coach-horse, mountain pony and lady's saddle-horse, and so individualizes them from all other existence. That this nature of the horse has any subjectivity in itself and apart from its specific forms, that it is anything more than a mental generalization on our part by which our reason identifies all the objects that our sense presents as individual, must strike every reader as absurd. But nothing can be alleged against such a superstition, which is not true in grander measure of universal Nature regarded as having any subjective existence or reality *in se*.

without, its proper subjectivity. But spiritual existence can be propagated indirectly by the medium of what we call Nature. For Nature having a most unquestioned and unquestionable existence to our sensuous thought, the Divine wisdom accepts and uses these rational *data* as the mould of His own more real and perfect communication. *Omne vivum*, say the physiologists, *ex ovo*; which means, that no form exists to our apprehension without some previous ground of existence, that nothing can be sensibly objective to us save in so far as it is first subjectively constituted. No farmer expects next year's crop, unless he sows this year's wheat. No father expects to become a father but by the intervention of a mother. Could the father beget offspring, and the farmer produce a crop directly from themselves, the product in both cases would evidently be visionary; because there would be no basis of discrimination possible in either case between product and producer. In like manner, precisely, the Architect of the spiritual creation accomplishes his work, not by the exhibition of magical* or instantaneous power, not by any idle and ostentatious incantation addressed to empty air, but solely by the inward fecundation of natural germs existing in our sensuous intelligence, and the consequent orderly development of a spiritual progeny every way commensurate with his own perfection.

In short, Nature, when philosophically regarded, expresses the lowest form of the human intelligence; what in early Christian speech was wont to be denominated "the natural *mind*." For it has no reality out of the mind. It is a mere hallucination of our nascent intelligence, which, having as yet no discernment of God's creative presence in the things of sense or

* Magic is the pretended power of instantaneous creation, — the art of producing things immethodically or without the use of means, thus by sheer force of will and without any aid from the understanding. It is the pretension to produce offspring without maternity, form without substance, soul without body, spirit without flesh, individuality without identity, life without existence. And by attributing this pretension to God, as we do when we suppose him to create spiritual existence directly from himself, or without the intervention of Nature and History, we not only virtually turn him into a mere flashy showman or conjurer, but we stigmatize the existence so created as an arrant imposture without rational depth or truth; for manifestly the stream cannot transcend its source, and if the Creator be a magician the creature must *a fortiori* prove a deception.

the lowest sphere of the mind, as well as in the things of spirit or its highest sphere, is driven meanwhile to attribute the former things to a universal mother called Nature, who lets none of their wants go unsatisfied. This is a necessary condescension of the creative Truth to our ignorance and imbecility, because the very existence of our reason is contingent upon it. For if, while we were spiritually incompetent to the Divine recognition, we had not the privilege of superstition even, or never felt ourselves haunted by the presence of a something in life more than meets the senses, these latter would of course control us, and our understanding die out, since fact in that case would no longer image or reveal Truth to us, but simply extinguish it, as with the animals.

But we are digressing; for the opportunity to ventilate the prejudice which besets us at the threshold of philosophic inquiry, as to Nature's autonomy or being *in se*, was too inviting to be resisted. Let us return, then, to our proper task, which was to show that all natural form or existence is made up of two movements;—one of which may be called generic or descending, as matriculating the thing or giving it body; the other, specific or ascending, as fecundating the thing, animating it, or giving it soul. Everything that naturally exists, everything that exists in any mode appreciable to our senses, is a composite of these two forces, a child of a double parentage;—one statical, giving it existence, which is fixity or rest; the other dynamical, giving it life, which is infinitude or motion. In short, Nature, whether in general or particular, is nothing but a living unit of two forces;—one of which we may name identity, as giving everything that exists subjective indistinction with all other existence; the other, individuality, as giving it objective and inextinguishable diversity from everything else. But now, in every natural form of existence below the human,—and this is what must forever make them lower forms,—the generic force, or force of identity, rules, and the specific force, or force of individuality, force of difference, serves. The resultant form, consequently, is without personality or selfhood, and hence destitute of that reality which the mind craves in Nature, when Nature is alleged as a proper basis of spiritual existence.

Now we want our readers to observe very closely here what is the true ground of Nature's unreality in all these lower forms of existence. It is that their individuality, or what gives them objective distinction from all other forms, is not one with their identity, or what gives them subjective consciousness. The iron is not cognizable to itself as iron, or in what distinguishes it from quartz or sulphur; the tree does not know itself as tree, or in what objectively distinguishes it from shrub or grass; the horse does not recognize himself as horse, or in what distinguishes him objectively from hog or sheep or tortoise. No; the total individuality, character, or being of these lower forms of existence obstinately refuses any subjective recognition or authentication on their part, and refers itself wholly to a higher intelligence. We are the Adam that gives name, quality, character, to all these lower things, and without whom they would instantly sink into chaotic indistinction. Hence it is that we call them and feel them unreal. They have no subjective apprehension of their objective or characteristic being; hence no aspiration to ally themselves with what is above themselves; in other words, no capacity of spiritual life.

If the reader have sufficiently weighed the observation here made, he will at once perceive that there is a vast interval between the absolute being of things and their phenomenal consciousness; that the former or objective element allies them with whatsoever is above themselves, the latter with whatsoever is below themselves. The two interests are as distinct as heaven and earth, day and night, and are never for an instant to be confounded, but only married in some new form of nature, like the human. Thus what *identifies* a thing, what gives it generic substance, what makes it subjectively or consciously exist, is never what *individualizes* it, is never what gives it specific form or character, never, in short, what makes it objectively to be; but, on the contrary, is most distinctly opposite, and even repugnant, to that. Why? Manifestly because the one function is material, constitutive, maternal, as giving the thing outward incorporation merely; the other, spiritual, creative, paternal, as giving it inward animation exclusively: and inward and outward are not directly but inversely related, the one beginning where the other ends, and ending

where the other begins. Thus what I consciously or subjectively am, I am by virtue exclusively of my natural organization, or what identifies me with my kind, and consequently alienates me from my creator. My absolute or unconscious being — my total spiritual possibility — refers itself of course directly to my creator ; but my phenomenal or conscious existence — that generic subjectivity which is *implied* in my specific objectivity — separates me from my creator, identifies me or gives me community with whatsoever is *not*-him. Thus much is essential to the bare conception of existence, — a conscious selfhood or subjectivity which shall alienate it from (make it other than) its objective ground of being. For what alone identifies a thing to its own consciousness is its *proper* form ; and unless, therefore, you first of all invest it with some *property* in itself, something inalienably its own, and hence inextinguishably opposed to what is the creator's in it, no basis can possibly exist for any subsequent creative communication to it. Now this property of things is exclusively natural ; is what we call their *nature*, what makes them *themselves*, or gives them identity, and so projects them from their creator. You may conceive of an excellent cistern to catch rain-water ; but if you have no materials wherein to project your conception, or give it outward body, the cistern of course will never exist, but remain an idea. That is, it can have no actual existence, no existence *in itself*, save in so far as it becomes sensibly dissociated with you, and endowed with its own indefeasible lineaments. The ideal form or being it has in you is one thing, and, of course, the essential or creative thing ; but the substantial existence or projection it craves *in itself*, by virtue of the wood or other material out of which it is fashioned, forever separates or alienates it from you, makes it forever incapable of being resumed in your æsthetic personality. Its actual identity, in other words, forever absorbs or swallows up the real or ideal individuality it has in you.

We cite this illustration only for the purpose of hinting to the reader what we wish to make distinctly intelligible to him, namely, that just as the wood or iron or stone that enters into the works of our hands gives them subjective or phenomenal constitution only, and by no means objective or real being, so

Nature fulfils a precisely similar *constitutive* function with respect to the human consciousness; and has no pretension to the slightest creative efficacy. Nature pertains to man only on his subjective side, or what makes him self-conscious; and is wholly impertinent to him on his objective side, or what makes him really to be. The marble is pertinent or existential to the statue as a mere subjective fact of existence identical with all other facts, but is wholly impertinent or unessential to it in its objective or individual aspect as a form of ideal beauty in the artist's soul. The works of a watch and its case give it subjective identity, or make it a fact of existence, equally with all other facts; but what makes it a watch, what gives it individuality or distinctive form, what makes it, in a word, objectively to be, is exclusively its function as a time-keeper. Now Nature stands in this purely subjective or constitutional relation to man, which the marble is under to the statue, or the works of a watch to its proper uses. It constitutes him to his own consciousness merely, and so furnishes a basis for his subsequent spiritual extrication; but it no more creates or gives him spiritual being, than the marble inspires the sculptor, or the works of a watch generate its dial-plate.

The truth of the analysis here made is almost obvious. It is the postulate of all logic, the implication of all thought, that what is common in existence must base whatsoever is proper, what is generic must base what is specific; in short, that the broadest identity must enter into, fill out, or subjectively constitute the sharpest diversity. Conceive, if you can, a form of existence so purely individual or different from every other form as to have absolutely nothing in common with it. You perceive at once that the conception must be a pure fantasy of your own brain, without the slightest basis in experience, incapable of being thought or named. What makes everything either thinkable or namable, what makes everything that exists *to exist* in subjective form, that is, what makes it *itself* either to its own or to others' perception, is exclusively what it possesses in common with all other existence, and by no means what it possesses in distinction from such existence. For example, what objectively characterizes the watch as a watch, what creates it or gives it spiritual individuality or distinction

from all other forms of existence, is its function of measuring time. But this function is not inherent in the watch subjectively regarded, is no way assignable to it so far merely as it is materially constituted, but is imposed upon it exclusively by its objective relations to its maker. The ideal or objective being of all watches as watches is to keep time, which they do never to their own intelligence or consciously, but to that of some superior power. But what gives every watch subjectivity, what makes it a specific or cognizable existence like everything else, is its material organization; and this organization causes it to differ specifically from all other watches, while giving it generic identity with all other things, watches included.

Or, instead of an artificial existence, take a natural one, say a horse, and you will observe the operation of the same necessity. For what makes the horse cognizable to you or to himself as an existing thing or fact of sense is by no means the functional activity which characterizes him to your rational regard, and leads you, therefore, to name him by some appropriate name which shall distinguish him from the ox, the ass, the elephant, and so forth; but exclusively his material or visible organization, which, while it individualizes him from all other horses as horses, gives him community or identity with all other things, horses included, as facts of existence.

Let the reader distinctly bear in mind, then, not only that every natural form or existence is made up of two inversive movements, one maternal or incorporative, the other paternal or enlivening, but also that the identity of the thing, its selfhood so to speak, whatsoever makes it a conscious or cognizable fact of existence, is constituted exclusively by the former or maternal element, and is thereby forever projected or alienated from the latter or paternal spiritual element, with which, consequently, it can come only into objective alliance or communion. Everything in nature, and indeed in art, claims a double parentage, one inward or from above, the other outward or from below; but the very thing *itself* generated by these invariable factors, its identity or total actuality, is referable exclusively to the inferior element, and separates it *toto cælo* from the superior one. Its selfhood or subjectivity is

intensely material in short, while it is spiritual only in its objective aspects and relations. Take again the watch for illustration, which claims both a body and a soul. Its body consists in its visible organization, which distinguishes it individually from all other watches, and identifies it with all other things. Its soul consists in the use or function it enacts as a time-keeper, and therefore gives it generic identity with all other watches, while giving it individuality or difference from all other things. I, the maker of the watch, have no regard for it, of course, save on its functional or soul-side, so that, however finely wrought and richly jewelled the watch may be in comparison with other watches or on its subjective material side, if it *does not keep time*, these lower or subjective qualifications will only stamp it, to my judgment, with a profounder objective imbecility. But the watch itself — if we could imagine it a living or conscious existence — *would recognize itself* only on its organic or constitutional side; and though it might be to my eyes all the while the poorest time-keeper extant, and therefore totally devoid of æsthetic justification or objective worth, it would yet — provided only it possessed a more showy subjective organization than other watches which better fulfilled the idea of a watch — be amply justified to its own eyes in assuming any amount of superiority to them. Its consciousness would identify it with its material body, or what it possessed in common with all existence; while its spiritual function as a time-keeper, or what individualizes it from all other existence, would forever transcend its consciousness, for the simple reason that, being imposed upon it *ab extra* or as a law of its objective being purely, it does not ask the concurrence or privity of its will. So my selfhood or identity always allies me in consciousness with my finite organization, with what I derive from Nature or my race; while my spiritual individuality, or what gives me as to my heart and mind enlargement or emancipation from that bondage, invariably refers itself away from me to a higher and infinite source, God. And so we may say of everything that exists, not only that it is an invariable product of two antagonistic movements, one finiting it, giving it subjectivity or projection from its kind in giving it substantial community or identity with all lower things; the other *in*-finiting it, so to speak, or giving it objec-

tive unity with its kind, in giving it formal diversity from all other existence ; but also that the former of these movements is most strictly in order to the latter.

But a truce to illustration. The reader by this time perfectly understands what we mean when we say that Nature is implied in man, just as the bodily viscera are implied in the body, as the works of a watch are implied in the watch, words in thought, or thought itself in affection. That is to say, it gives him phenomenal existence, existence to his own consciousness, but has not the slightest pretension to give him absolute being, which is being irrespective of his own consciousness. The Church has never had a misgiving as to the negative import of this proposition, namely, that Nature is not *essential* to man, does not give him real, but only apparent, individuality. But it wholly overlooks its positive import, which is, that Nature is nevertheless *existential* to man, that it constitutes him or makes him cognizable to himself, and hence is indissolubly involved in his moral evolution. And the sceptic, on his side, perfectly discerns the constitutional efficacy Nature is under to man, understands perfectly that we should be wholly lifeless or unconscious without her maternal mediation ; but he goes no step beyond this, nor ever dreams apparently that what constitutes a thing or gives it phenomenal existence must of necessity be *inversely* related to what creates it or gives it absolute being : inasmuch as the one operation is purely subjective and falls below the thing, the other purely objective and transcends it. And yet Philosophy claims no more fundamental deliverance than this. The constitution of a thing — what gives it phenomenal body, and so renders it appreciable either to itself or to others — has no direct, but only an inverse relevancy to its creative substance, or what gives it rational soul ; has precisely the same relevancy to it, in fact, that the shell of an oyster or an egg has to the nourishment which the contents of such shell, *when consumed*, afford to my life.

We may say, then, that the religious hypothesis of existence is philosophically vicious, in that it takes, or rather makes, no account of the *identity* of things, of what makes them *appear* either to themselves or others ; and the scientific hypothesis similarly vicious, in that it takes no account of the *individuality*

of things, or what makes them to be irrespectively both of their own consciousness and the cognizance of others. The one makes no account of the subjective or constitutive element in all existence. The other makes no account of its objective or creative element. Thus Faith has been always impotent to suspect that our moral freedom really expresses the unswerving spiritual dependence we are under to God, and is sure to explicate it by some hypothesis of our acquired independence. It never suspects, in other words, what is literally true, that our moral — which is our natural — history is a pure *incident* of the spiritual being we have in God ; but regards it rather as an *accident* of some subsequent inexplicable departure we have made from such being. In a word, it has never been content to view our moral experience as befalling our spiritual individuality *ab intra* exclusively, but represents it as rigidly supervening *ab extra*. And Science, in her turn, complacently ignores this spiritual *evolution* in us, which the bare fact of Nature's involution in our consciousness forces upon the gaze of Philosophy, and restricts her observation to the phenomena which attest our natural subjectivity. In short, Faith asserts our individuality with such emphasis as practically to deny the truth of our constitutional identity with all other existence ; while Science, in its turn, is so intent upon the latter more obvious and superficial interest, as practically to blink out of sight the subtler and more dazzling one.

In this state of things, of course, both Faith and Science confess themselves alike obnoxious to philosophic rebuke. For Philosophy, rightly conceived, contemplates a scheme of cosmical order, which makes the subjective identity of things a most strict incident of their objective individuality, or turns our natural existence into a rigid implication, and no longer explication, of our spiritual being ; so forever discharging Nature of the preposterous creative burden which our sensuous reason is wont to lay upon it. What a boon, then, he would confer on the intellect, who, on the one hand, should persuade the man of faith to see in Nature the purely subjective imagery which God allows to man, in order that he may eventually come to the knowledge of himself as spiritually created ; and, on the other, should persuade the man of science to see in man the objective

reality which God bestows on Nature in order eternally to connect mineral, vegetable, and animal with himself! For then, doubtless, he would persuade them both, ere long, to abandon their fruitless rivalry, and unite to honor in Nature and History the literal statics and dynamics of a great creative operation, which has for its sole possible issue the perfect spiritual conjunction or fellowship of man with God.

But such high themes, however seducing, are not ours to-day. Our logical and urgent business for the present is very simple. It is to show the reader how Nature, mineral, vegetable, and animal, regarded as an involution of our moral consciousness, promotes the evolution of that consciousness. We set out with a design to convince the reader, in spite of the devotee on one hand and the sceptic on the other, that Nature offered a basis of reality to the spiritual creation. We undertook to show him that moral existence or human nature alone afforded that incontestable reality which is at bottom the desideratum of all true Faith and true Science. We have completed one part of our task only. We have shown him that Nature, mineral, vegetable, or animal, is a mere implication or involution of human nature; that all the individuality, all the distinctive form, quality, character, of the lower tribes, — all, in short, that makes them absolutely *to be*, irrespective of their phenomenal and fleeting consciousness of existence, — refers itself to man, is but an appanage of his intelligence, and never to be cognized as existing apart from his intelligence. But now one thing more remains for us to do. This is to show how Nature, being thus regarded as an appanage of man, as involved in his comprehensive personality, does nevertheless distinctly *evolve* him, distinctly decline the honor both of his origin and his destiny. For this is her sole philosophic interest and justification, that she evolves Man, just as the marble evolves the statue or the mother the child, and has consequently no power to involve — which would be to defeat — that result. The marble says in effect: The being of the statue, its ideal form or quality, its characteristic individuality, all that makes it statue, in fact, and not mere stone, is not in me, but in the genius of the artist that conceives it. The mother says in effect: The being of the child, its moral form or quality, all that makes it man, in short, and

not animal, is not in me, but in the father who begets it. So Nature, mineral, vegetable, and animal, says in effect: The being of man is not in me, but in something whereof I have no intelligence. On the contrary, her being is confessedly involved in his, as the cloth is involved in the coat, the trunk in the branches, the branches in the leaves, the leaves in the fruit; and has no more ability accordingly to determine the issue, than the material upon which we work has power to determine the æsthetic issues we propose. It is true that any given piece of marble may prove refractory to the statuary's skill, or any given marriage prove unfruitful, just as any given man may drown his moral faculty in animal delights. But the general truth of the proposition is, nevertheless, incontestable, that the material element, both in art and nature, is bound to the service of the formal one; and that Nature herself analogically in man's evolution, and however it may fare with this or that exceptional man, occupies a rigidly servile or secondary position, while the creative Spirit shapes it to what issues he will.

How, then, does Nature evolve man? This is the question we are bound to answer to the reader's entire satisfaction, or else fail of the purpose with which we set out. Let us begin at once by frankly avowing that it will be quite impossible to do this, unless we can first establish a normal and complete distinction between man and all lower forms of existence, — unless we can prove, in other words, that human nature, instead of being the development which it is loosely supposed to be of all lower natures, is in truth their decisive arrest and confutation. For our logical purpose is to obviate the cavils which a superstitious faith and a sceptical science urge against the truth of a spiritual creation, and which they both alike base upon the illusoriness of Nature, by resolving Nature itself into man. And if, therefore, it can be legitimately replied to us, that man himself is a veritable child of Nature, a normal development of mineral, vegetable, and animal, our labor, of course, ends in naught. We base the spiritual creation upon man, who is a conscious subject of Nature. If, then, Nature be illusory in its human form of administration, as well as in its mineral, vegetable, and animal forms, why then undoubtedly human nature claims only a phenomenal truth, and affords no real basis to

the spiritual creation. We might, indeed, evade the difficulty by resorting to the feeble quibble in vogue among disingenuous theologians, who sometimes pretend that man, being a moral existence, is so far not a natural one. But this pretension is a sheer insult to Science, which declares morality to be just as real, though not so palpable, a form of natural existence as either gravitation in the mineral, sensibility in the vegetable, or volition in the animal. Morality is the express badge of human *nature*, properly speaking; i. e. of what distinguishes man generically or as man, and not specifically as Paul, John, Peter. We have no right, consequently, to make morality a supernatural qualification in its subject, nor shall we have recourse to any such violent subterfuge. We frankly admit, nay we insist, that morality furnishes that common bond of identity between one man and every other which constitutes just what we call human *nature*. And what we maintain is, that this nature itself, in place of its being an orderly progress or development of lower natures, is, on the contrary, their decisive and eternal *arrest*. And now to make this clear.

The peculiarity of every lower form of Nature, mineral, vegetable, and animal, is that its generic element, or what gives it community of substance with other existence, is primary or commanding, while its specific element, or what gives it formal diversity from other existence, is secondary and subservient: so that, however distinguished or individualized any specific mineral, vegetable, or animal may be, the distinction is wholly congenital, inferring no inward consciousness in its subject's bosom responsive to the outward fact, and confessing itself, therefore, a purely natural phenomenon. Throughout the entire realm of Nature, including man himself *so far as his physical attributes go*, the specific or distinctively individual force always puts on more or less generic or common form; and it is only in moral existence that absolute individuality is reached, or the formal, feminine, spiritual element in existence confesses itself one and equal with the substantial, masculine, natural element. Unless, therefore, man supervened upon mineral, vegetable, and animal, the generic element, becoming ever more and more domineering as it proceeds from lower to higher existences, would end by organizing some gigantic forms

of animation adequate to its own overwhelming might ; such as are only faintly shadowed by the monstrous birds, beasts, and reptiles which desolated the earth previous to man's advent, and whose fossil remains we shudder over in our scientific museums.

Moral existence, and that alone, arrests this downward tendency of Nature. How? Simply by equilibrating in itself the two forces of Nature, genus and species, race-force and family-force, force of universality and force of individuality. In man, viewed morally, the hitherto oppressed or overborne specific element becomes released from the clutch of the hitherto dominant generic force,—becomes lifted out of its previous abasement, and put on a footing of equality with its master ; his distinctively moral consciousness being contingent upon his ability to appropriate to himself individually, or make his own, the good and evil which in truth pertain to him only as a partaker of human nature, only as associated with all other men. The animal may be beautiful or powerful or vivacious as compared with other animals, or it may be ugly, feeble, and torpid ; yet it has no interior or individual consciousness of the fact as man has, does not grow elated or depressed thereupon, but betrays an utter unconsciousness alike of its good and its evil fortune. The manifest reason is, that the relation between his specific form and universal Nature is not a conjugal one, implying the essential equality of the parties to it, but a relation at most of chance concubinage, in which one party is tyrant and the other slave.

With man the case is wholly otherwise. In him genus and species, substance and form, nature and spirit, body and soul, are perfectly mated and married beyond all chance of divorce, so that every man who has come to manhood or moral consciousness claims an individual property in all the motions of his nature. If he compare favorably in outward respects with his fellow-men, he cannot help being inwardly enamored of himself ; if unfavorably, he cannot help being dejected and unhappy. If his natural temperament be harsh, passionate, revengeful, and express itself in corresponding actions, or if his intellect be of a subtle, sinuous quality, inclining him to concealment, intrigue, or diplomacy, he feels himself personally identified with the character, and exposed to whatever discredit

it involves. And if he be of a gentle natural disposition, inclining him to conciliatory methods of action, he makes that inheritance his own personal possession, and would sadly forego the revenue of esteem it brings him. Now all this, we say, takes place with man only because a strictly conjugal tie — a tie of complete equality — obtains between the generic and specific elements of his consciousness; only because the Divinely-breathed Eve of his spirit is indissolubly married to the coarse Adam of his flesh, and brings forth fruit to him no longer passively or perforce, but with passionate love and desire.

Our readers now perceive the inextinguishable difference between human nature and all lower natures. Man is never directly, but only inversely, related to any of these forms. What we call nature in the mineral, vegetable, and animal, the generic principle, principle of kind or identity, becomes in man exquisitely individual or specific; so that the very nature of man, or what universally identifies him as man, is not any mere organic sameness, such as identifies the animals, but a wholly inorganic freedom. The natural principle, or principle of identity with him, is no longer animality, or passive subjection to his physical organization, but morality, or active insubjection to it, being the power of independent action. Nature, from being merely physical or instinctual in lower forms, becomes rational or moral in man; hence we may say that man's very nature, or what he has in common with all men, implies his uncompromising consciousness of individuality or difference from them. His most abject identification with his kind, or his natural humanity, consists in this, that he is inexpugnably himself, sole arbiter of his own actions, and rightfully subject to no extraneous power. As we have already and amply seen, Nature strictly speaking, and with reference to any and all given existence, limits itself to a constitutional function as giving material or common substance to things, and utterly disavows any creative efficacy as giving them also ideal or objective form. Now the logical *differentia* of man from all lower existences is, that even this natural constitution of his endows him with selfhood, or relates him negatively to God; so that without selfhood he would really not possess common or generic manhood, but remain forever mere tiger or sheep, mere serpent or dove.

Such is the wondrous transformation Nature undergoes in its human form of administration. No sooner does man appear upon the scene than this generic force, which in mineral, plant, and animal holds itself so aloof from the specific force, and coerces it at its own pleasure, hastens to make over to the latter all its substance, woos it, wins it, weds it, commits its happiness and guidance unmisgivingly to it; so that the word Nature in application to man loses the import it claims in reference to all other existence as utterly dominating the subject's individuality, and becomes itself a voucher of the intensest individuality. In every form of existence below the human, the generic element rules, or is absolute, while the specific element is utterly servile or subservient. The generic element is everything, in other words, and the specific nothing, save as an illustration of the other. In man, on the contrary, and exactly in so far as his human quality, which is his moral force, asserts itself, the specific element is everything, and the race element comparatively nothing. This is a marvellous difference, going to the length of demonstrating that human nature or moral existence, in place of being a development of animal nature or physical existence, is in fact its palpable inversion. Man is man in the most *generic* sense of the word even, not by virtue of his evincing the highest animal qualities, but by virtue simply of his evincing the intensest contrast to the animal type of existence. What is highest in the animal, namely, appetite or passion, is lowest in man. And what is highest, or alone distinctive in man, namely, spontaneous action, does not exist in the animal, or exists only in instinctual automatic form. In the lower forms of existence the specific principle, principle of individuality, is utterly overborne by that of universality, and no breath of moral life consequently diversifies their monotonous existence. To eat and sleep and propagate each his various kind, is the law of their being; and to attribute any selfhood or individuality to them, apart from these purely natural functions, is the height of sentimental folly.

Man, on the other hand, is all selfhood or individuality, so that when we find his physical nature overbearing or coercing his moral quality, we no longer call him man, but idiot.

The idiot is a very good animal man ; indeed, his physical vigor, as a general thing, exceeds that of average manhood ; but no one deems him a man, because he is destitute of the human quality which is moral force, force of selfhood, implying a perfect fusion or marriage between the constitutive elements of Nature, individuality and universality, or self and the neighbor. No matter how perfect the idiot's animal quality may be, the principle of individuality is even more dormant in him than it is in the animal proper, so that he is incapable even of obeying his own instincts or ministering to his own physical necessities. While in man, however puny or infirm his animal development may be, the individual force is so vivacious and free, so every way equal and adequate to the generic force, that the latter instinctively aspires to conciliate it, covets its possession, forsakes father and mother for it, cleaves to it as one flesh with itself, calls it wife and mother of all that truly lives.

In short, man is the Sabbath of Nature, because in human nature the specific force is not only every way equal to the generic force, but is indissolubly married or united with it, so that every man personally appropriates or makes his own, without any misgiving, whatever good or evil he naturally inherits. What is so strong and overpowering in all the lower forms of existence, nature, race-force, the communistic element, puts on in man specific form, becomes swallowed up in fact and reproduced in intensely personal or characteristic lineaments. Hence our feeling of responsibility, our sense of right and wrong, of truth and falsity, our recognition of law, our hope of reward, our fear of punishment. For if human nature thus resumes or presents in itself the unity and consummation of all lower natures, it becomes at once evident, not only that man is not a subject of Nature in any such sense as animal and plant are, but also that the very form of his nature turns it into a mere basis for a higher or spiritual manhood, for an inward individuality or character intensely opposite to his natural one, being made up of his relations to infinite goodness and truth.

Thus in man or moral existence Nature lets go her hold upon her nursling, discharges him of the long unconscious bondage

he has been under to her appetites and passions as the supreme law of his activity, and puts him under law exclusively to himself, that is, hands him over to the admonition of an inward law, which is the law of conscience, the law of our spiritual life. Human nature—humanity as opposed to animality—means what all men possess in common; thus what distinguishes man as man, namely, selfhood or moral power, which is the power of rationally determining his own action. And this moral power in man, this natural selfhood or freedom which he enjoys, constituting him his own arbiter between good and evil, between true and false, implies, of course, an inward law or light telling him what good and evil, truth and falsity, respectively are, and so insuring all the possibilities of his spiritual destiny. And this law or light is what we call conscience, the law of our immortal conjunction with God, the light which illumines every man that comes into the world, and without which he is spiritually not a man.

How absurd, then, to talk of man as if he were developed out of lower natural forms! It is not a whit less absurd than it would be to talk of the statue as a development of the marble, or the picture as a development of the canvas and the paint which go to its phenomenal constitution. No, human nature is not the development, but the authoritative arrest, of all lower natures; and as the authority for such arrest plainly does not derive from man himself, or inhere in the human consciousness, we are not only free, but we feel ourselves forced, to attribute it to a Divine power in our nature. And if human nature itself can rightfully claim a Divine vivification and administration, it is not unreasonable to anticipate for every partaker of that nature, who livingly recognizes and reverences the divinity enshrined in it, an individual or spiritual expansion which shall ally him in immortal intimacy with God.

We have now, as we conceive, fairly made out our point, which was, that it was totally unphilosophic to attempt compassing a science of Nature without taking man as its starting-point rather than its fruit, and making universal Nature fall within, and not without, his majestic unity, as the furniture of a house falls within, and not without, its walls. No doubt a great deal of excellent scientific drudgery may be accomplished

without any recourse being had to man. But every attempt to universalize Nature, or construct a purely scientific cosmogony, must confess itself a puerile imitation of the builders of Babel, and end in a clashing of systems no less fatal to true intelligence than that typical confusion of tongues. No one would lightly question the consciously devout temper of mind which is likely to urge every such attempt; but the attempt itself is in flagrant opposition to the philosophic spirit. For every one who pretends to argue from Nature directly up to God, must deliberately leave out Man, in whom alone the two terms meet and mutually embrace. He is like an engineer who should project a bridge from earth to heaven, or from anywhere to nowhere, without any intervening substance or middle ground of contact in which to sink his piles. The natural theologian who proposes to go from Nature *directly* up to God, ignores the while that, as Nature's descent from God takes place only through man, so any subsequent ascent to Him on her part will be practicable only through the same channel; and hence his labors always fail of engaging any popular enthusiasm. For it is impossible that man should ever find himself so lacking in self-respect as not to grow jocund over every cosmology, whose beggarly necessities compel it to profane his capital significance in making him the mere perfected tail-piece of creation, the all-accomplished progeny of a long line of illustrious mud-turtles and monkeys.

But our space presses, and however seductive our theme, and however much we leave unsaid, we must at once return to our beginnings, and apply the light we have gained to the adjustment of the relations between Faith and Science.

Science is doubtless the impassioned enemy of the supernatural, whenever that word is used to signify a Divine power exerted in opposition to the methods of Nature. This is the popular theologic sense of the word, to signify a Divine power exerted, not *through* Nature, which would be a spiritual power, but *upon* Nature or from without, and hence capable on occasion of arresting her processes and deranging her order. Science does not hesitate devoutly to denounce every such conception as puerile and fallacious. For it discerns such unmistakable marks of an infinite power exerted through the

methods of Nature, as needs make it revolt at the notion of the same power exerting itself at the same time in contradictory methods. Science has no vocation, of course, to reconstruct our existing theologies and philosophies. But she has every right to insist that these latter, in their turn, shall learn to respect her domain, in ceasing to affirm an outward interference with Nature's order, of which Nature herself preserves no memorial. She declares it to be essential to her integrity, to her existence even, that all the phenomena of Nature and all the events of History be regarded as *inherent* in Nature and History, and not *adherent* as imposed by some outward power. And as self-preservation is the supreme law, no one can reasonably complain of Science making this demand. What, then, hinders Faith conceding thus much to her?

Nothing, we suspect, but a lingering naturalism, of which Faith herself had better every way be rid,—a naturalistic habit of thought which she inherits from the past, and which has no longer any congruity with the best life of the world. It cannot be doubted, we think, that supernaturalism as a dogma implies naturalism as a mental habit in those who zealously cherish it. The dogma originally rose as a check upon those naturalistic or materialist conceptions of the *summum bonum*, which belong to our spiritual or intellectual infancy, and which, if left unchecked, would consign us to permanent disorder and death. While our intellect is still immersed in sense, and we are incapable of any living or spiritual approximation to the Divine name, we must either soon outgrow all remembrance of that name, or else be permitted to acknowledge it in a form level to our sensuous perceptions. Our instinctive reverence forbids us to regard God as a denizen of Nature. It is in fact our own overpowering want of some adequate egress from her iron sway which makes us cleave with tenacious faith to a Divine existence transcending Nature, and capable of giving *us* also eventual extrication. Nature holds us by our moral endowments, our instinct of freedom or personality, in remorseless bondage to her will; and unless, therefore, some higher or interior law intervene to dispute her dominion and challenge our obedience, we should live and die as the animals do, without hope. She endows us *alone* with selfhood, or the

sentiment of an individual power and responsibility commensurate with all the demands of our identity with our kind, — a power and responsibility of self-maintenance and self-government co-extensive with all the exactions of our social constitution ; and hence she subjects us to an inward or spiritual disease and blight which the lilies of the field and the birds of the air are all unconscious of. By an indomitable instinct accordingly of our creative source, of the creative infinitude, we resent Nature's tyranny, or insist upon the existence of a power superior to hers, and capable of giving us, if not universal, at least individual, redemption from her doom ; and religion accordingly assumes the form of an affirmation of such existence.

Now, manifestly, there are but two ways open to religion of postulating the Divine existence, — one characteristic of it in its living form of administration, the other in its ritual form ; namely, *first*, as a *spiritual* power, giving an exclusively inward being to things, and *to that end alone* consecrating their outward form, or endowing them with self-consciousness ; *secondly*, as a *supernatural* power, operating upon Nature from without, and moulding it to His will, as we mould our dependents to our will, by motives addressed to their hopes and fears. The former of these conceptions belongs obviously only to the perfected stature of the mind, and is impossible to us so long as the claims of a mere physical subsistence occupy and absorb the attention of the race. The second conception accordingly is the inevitable one ; so that religion in the infancy of our mental development never means the ascription of properly spiritual attributes to God, but, at most, of supernatural ones. Having, then, this legitimate root in our mental necessities, the dogma of supernaturalism, as a sufficing theory of creation, will remain valid and unquestionable only so long as the demand for it keeps up ; only so long, that is to say, as the mind is *contentedly* naturalistic. Whenever the disease abates which the dogma is intended to keep within bounds, the dogma itself will decline or fall into disuse, and not before. As soon as our mental conceptions from sensual become rational and spiritual, we shall unlearn our superstitious regard for Nature ; and unlearning that, we shall discern God's literally creative presence and power in all the life of our senses, no less than in that of our souls.

But the mind is no longer contentedly naturalistic. Science itself is the irrefragable evidence of the fact; for it is doing its unconscious best all the while to spiritualize Nature, or discharge the mind of its chronic naturalism, by resolving all existence into a mode of motion, that is, converting it from a fixed to a purely functional quantity. Naturalism is the mental habit in which sense governs reason, and we infer, not as the spiritual man does, from within to without, or from reality to appearance, but contrariwise, from appearance to reality, or without to within; and so conclude that everything really is as finite as it seems. We may say that naturalism consists in our conceiving of being as essentially finite and unrelated; while to the spiritual understanding it is essentially infinite and one. Now Science, or our rational development, bridges over the interval between these opposite states of intelligence. It furnishes the transition between the sensuous and the spiritual judgments of the mind, by showing us the ratio or relationship which binds every form of existence to every other. It completely denies the judgment of sense, which declares all existence to be fixed or absolute, by proving everything fluid and relative to everything else; or, what is the same thing, by resolving universal Nature from a finite to an indefinite quantity, and so preparing the way for an ultimate recognition of infinite and finite, God and man, creator and creature, as indissolubly one. It is an inappreciable service which Science is thus rendering to Faith itself, if Faith itself were only cognizant of the boon, and did not dispose itself rather to deny and deride its reality. But the real or living Faith of the world is scarcely compromised by this infidelity on the part of its official representatives. However persistently the defenders of our various ritual systems may turn a deaf ear to the voice of Science, the common people are by no means indifferent to the hopes it inspires, but on the contrary gladly listen to it. They at least are no longer contentedly naturalistic, but are reverently striving to trace out and acknowledge the footsteps of Deity in every most familiar field of our secular experience.

The characteristic phenomenon of the era in which we live is the extraordinary activity of the social conscience, is the en-

hanced and indeed irresistible might accruing to the sentiment of human society, fellowship, equality. The sentiment presupposes an augmented sense of our proper or spiritual individuality on the one hand, and of our common or natural identity on the other; and is itself the perfect reconciliation or marriage of these hitherto warring elements. This social consciousness, it is important to observe, is no mere intellectual inspiration by any means confined to a few advanced thinkers here and there, but a living instinct of the popular heart. It is an outbirth of the advancing spiritual life of the world, and demands, therefore, a living Faith and a living Science to do it justice. Our present Faith and Science have to do, not with the life, but the memory. The one is fast anchored in the letter of revelation, and is wholly indifferent to the Divine spirit which animates that letter. The other is fast anchored in the facts of knowledge or observation, and is indifferent to the human truth which alone sanctifies and illumines those facts. Neither of these, consequently, furnishes an adequate vehicle to God's living or spiritual commerce with the soul. They are neither of them life, but only a preparatory discipline or education for it; so that when life itself appears they disappear, to be reproduced in superior vital form. It much behooves our existing Faith and Science, accordingly, to unlearn their idle jargoning, and betake themselves hand in hand to the new fountain of the water of life upspringing from the truth of our associated destiny. The intellect must otherwise altogether disown them in the interest of a Faith and Science which shall have no longer any time for mutual recrimination and slaughter, but shall be livingly and lovingly blent in the promotion of all order, peace, and innocence in every field of human action.

A living Faith and a living Science are of course impossible so long as we continue to view Nature in the light shed upon it by our prevalent devout and rationalistic habits of thought.*

* According to our current theology we become cognizable to God only in so far as we become discharged, practically, of our natural identity, or what ties us to other men. According to our immature science we become cognizable to God only in so far as we become discharged of our spiritual individuality, or what differences us from our kind. Either of these pretensions, it hardly needs to be said, is pre-

Nature is in truth a purely logical quantity, having no *raison d'être* beyond the necessities of our rational subjectivity. The reason why we spiritually attribute ourselves to her, or regard her as having an absolute objectivity, is that we are without any living apprehension as yet of creative order, and are consequently unprepared to see in the various realms of sense, so overpowering to our untutored imagination, a purely subjective imagery and correspondence of the spiritual creation, a mere mute revelation of our objective or spiritual relations with God. If we could only know the highest truth intuitively, or without the mediation of a scientific experience, of course we should need no revelation upon the subject, any more than a ship requires a purchase upon the land to warp it out of its harbor, when the wind is fairly filling its sails. In that case, indeed, we should be spiritual animals, not men, realizing our spiritual destiny as the animal realizes natural existence; that is, without a fibre of personal concurrence or privity on our part. But the thing is impossible. Our intellect is of necessity for a long time in abject bondage to the senses; that is, takes for granted some *noumenal* reality called Nature, and answerable to the various phenomena our senses enfold; and hence it remains closed to the entrance of a spiritual idea. The fœtus is wholly unconscious of the moral force — force of selfhood — which shall yet emancipate it from the maternal bosom, and endow it with the freedom of a new world. Instincts — prophecies — of the coming event announce themselves in the restlessness it often betrays under the maternal bonds; but it is the mother alone who is conscious of them. It is the mere unconscious swelling of the bud preparatory to its blossoming, — the inflorescence necessary to its subsequent efflorescence, — and awakens no sensibility in the subject. So we, while our intellect is wholly unspiritualized, or still in abeyance to sense, have no adequate

posterously untrue; and the Faith and Science of the future accordingly will insist upon such a rectification of prevalent modes of thought as shall show the Divine name alike bound up with the interests of our natural identity and those of our spiritual individuality; as will show it capable indeed of endowing us with the latter supreme gift, only because it was first able to endow us with the infinitely more adorable former one.

apprehension, nor any shrewd suspicion even, of the great social destiny to which we are providentially hastening, and which will eventually elevate us out of Nature's thralldom, by showing her to be at bottom our own unlimited servant. And all those fitful involuntary motions and signs by which meanwhile the truth solicits our philosophic recognition, motions and signs of disease, of vice and crime, of what we call misfortune even, make no impression upon our properly spiritual consciousness, but at most leave our moral sensibilities wounded and bleeding. We have no idea that such things have a unitary universal root, and hence we never dream of anything but the most partial and egotistic extrication from them. While this puerile and yet conceited state of the intellect lasts, Nature operates as a complete superstition upon the imagination, spiritually alienating us from God, and dwarfing our recognition of him to the dimensions, at most, of some literal symbols of his creative name. But these literal symbols themselves are only so many ultimate forms or expressions of the great unconscious personality of the race, providentially projected athwart our historic pathway with a view to educate the individual consciousness into harmony with universal principles, by stimulating and fixing its reverent worship. And they are consequently sure sooner or later, that is, after they shall have been sufficiently coerced and solicited, to collapse, and in so doing reveal to our very senses the ineffable Divine-and-Human substance with which this stupendous fiction called Nature has been all along spiritually charged.

Revelation,—the gradual induction of the created intelligence into the apprehension of spiritual existence,—such, we do not hesitate to affirm, is the only sufficing explication of the mystery and function of Nature. We are born, of course, in the densest ignorance and imbecility with respect to spiritual things, and owe our entire education to the majestic forms of truth garnered up in the experience of the race, and thence handed down to our reverent homage. Nature and history are obviously the only avenues of such experience. They alone reveal to man all that he can ever know of spiritual things prior to a living experience of them; and this knowledge at its highest is not life, but only the rude earth or mould,

out of which life is eventually to flower. Nature accordingly has not the least right to control our thought, but only to aid or serve it; just as the boat does not control, but only aids or serves the voyager, whom it brings to his destined haven. We may, no doubt, infer from the lower to the higher, but have no right to *conclude*, under penalty of eventually closing the mind against spiritual verities. At best, Nature is but a subjective correspondence of eternal Truth, as realized by our infirm understanding; if, therefore, we mistake her for the objective Truth itself, as it exists to the Divine mind, we are in danger of shutting ourselves up spiritually in impenetrable night. The law of a rigid correspondence between natural and spiritual things is the only sane instrument of philosophic thought. The relation between Spirit and Nature is not one of continuity, but of the strictest correspondence, like that between a cause and its effect, or between a man's face and the image of that face in a glass; and palpably, therefore, the only witness we can expect, or indeed allow, from Nature to Spirit is a reflex, not a direct one. Nature answers to Spirit as body to soul, not as being a prolongation of it, but only its echo or repercussion, whereby whatsoever is spiritually highest becomes naturally lowest, and what is spiritually lowest is presented as naturally highest. It is a subtle, not a frank witness, telling the truth fully, but telling it after its own manner or law of inversion, whereby whatsoever is good and lovely in the original becomes evil and unlovely in the copy; that so the reciprocal integrity of the factors may be secure.

Revelation, viewed strictly, is a veiling over or obscuration of the essential Divine Truth, in order to accommodate it to the needs of our nascent intelligence. You would not uncover the eyes of a new-born babe to the light of the mid-day sun. It would be wanton cruelty to do so. But the eyes of our dawning spirituality are equally sensitive to the direct rays of the sun of truth. They would shrivel like a scroll in a furnace if exposed to its unclouded splendor, and absolutely exact, therefore, that it come tempered or diminished to our recognition through this dense mask of fallacious natural appearance, which may *negatively* induct us into its knowledge. We have, therefore, no right to look upon Nature as a direct mani-

festation of Divine Truth, which would be intolerable, but only as a mystical correspondence or revelation of it in accommodation to the needs of our sensuous understanding. It is not truth absolutely, but truth as it descends to creative manifestation, or submits to the coercion and imprisonment of the created consciousness. It is the truth shorn of its eternal lustre, dimmed to the needs of our phenomenal or passing subjectivity, taking upon it the burden of our sins and infirmities, consenting to appear in all points such as we are, that we, through its unparalleled humiliation unto death, may become exalted into the participation of its life. In short, it is a mirror, not of the direct creative effulgence, but only of that effulgence as necessarily clouded, distorted, and refracted through the medium of our dense carnality.

Let us make up our minds, then, that the good we derive from Nature is not positive or final, but simply educative or provisional. She constitutes us provisionally to our own perception by giving us seeming existence, *quasi* selfhood, and so renders us inwardly practicable to the Divine manipulation. But she confers no jot of true being upon us. She furnishes us the needful sphere of identity, — the solid ground of consciousness, — whereupon we forever separate ourselves from the infinite, in assigning ourselves finite proportions. But she gives us no most transient breath of spiritual life or individuality. She is indeed as utterly involved in us as substance is involved in form, body in soul, seeming in being; so conferring upon us that fixed or conscious subjectivity which forever projects or morally alienates us from God, only that we may thereby become spiritually conjoined with him, — that domestic or private selfhood, that home sanctity, which in actual or moral regards disjoins us with our kind, only that we may become in all real or social regards united with it. She is thus, as we have said before, neither creative nor created, neither properly Divine nor properly human; but all simply an indefinite neutral quantity, whose use is to insure us the amplest objective conjunction with God and our fellows, by first of all avouching our amplest subjective inequality or difference both with him and with them.